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NFL TAKES A PAGE FROM THE BIG TOBACCO PLAYBOOK:
ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN THE CTE CRISIS
ABSTRACT
Traumatic brain injury in sports, once considered an injury you could “rub
some dirt on” and get back in the game after, has risen to the level of a public
health epidemic over the past decade. Most public attention to the issue is
connected to high-profile National Football League (NFL) athletes, increasing
numbers of whom are diagnosed post-mortem with chronic traumatic
encephalopathy (CTE), a progressive neurological disorder with symptoms akin
to Alzheimer’s. With gridiron giants like Mike Webster, Terry Long, Andre
Waters, and Junior Seau sleeping on train station floors and drinking antifreeze, their greatest legacy may no longer be the things they gave to the game
of football, but what the game of football took from them.
As research connecting CTE with repeated blows on the football field grows,
the NFL faces litigation concerning its role in preventing or raising awareness
of this issue. In response, the League has taken a page from the tobacco industry
playbook by employing the same strategies used during decades of litigation
surrounding the adverse health consequences of smoking cigarettes.
Accordingly, this Comment explores the utility of using Big Tobacco as a
predictive template for future NFL/CTE litigation by unpacking the historical
parallels and distinctions between these two industry giants, especially as
pertains to an assumption of risk defense. Ultimately, this comparative analysis
informs litigation strategy by outlining the unique pressures and structures
faced by NFL plaintiffs such that they should overcome an assumption of risk
defense in CTE cases. While their circumstances are fundamentally different,
NFL athletes face the same institutional complicity and orchestrated denial as
did tobacco users, only this time, all of America has a Sunday ticket.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 19, 2017, former New England Patriots tight end Aaron
Hernandez1 hanged himself with a bed sheet in a Massachusetts prison.2
Hernandez was serving a life sentence for the 2013 murder of Odin Lloyd and
had been acquitted of two other murders just days earlier.3 Suspecting
neurological problems, Hernandez’s family donated his brain to the CTE Center
at Boston University, where top neuropathologists discovered classic markers
for chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE): an abundance of abnormal protein
tau in the frontal lobe and around small blood vessels.4 His hippocampus and
fornix (responsible for memory) and amygdala (responsible for emotional
regulation, fear, and anxiety) were also severely affected.5 This led head
researcher Dr. Ann McKee to conclude that at the age of twenty-seven,
Hernandez had the most severe case of CTE the CTE Center had ever seen in
someone his age, with “damage . . . akin to that of players well into their 60s.”6
While McKee declined to use pathology as a way to retrospectively explain or
excuse Hernandez’s murderous behavior, she stated that “in our collective
experience . . . individuals with CTE—and CTE of this severity—have
difficulty with impulse control, decision-making, inhibition of impulses for
aggression, emotional volatility, [and] rage behaviors.”7
In response, Hernandez’s estate filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of his fouryear-old daughter, Avielle, against the National Football League (NFL) and the
New England Patriots. The suit seeks $20 million in damages to compensate
Avielle for the deprivation of “love, affection, society and companionship of her
father while he was alive.”8 The complaint alleges that both the NFL and the

1
See generally S.I. Wire, Key Moments in the Life of Aaron Hernandez, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 19,
2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/04/19/aaron-hernandez-timeline-career-life (outlining highlights of
Hernandez’s athletic, personal, and criminal experiences).
2
Adam Kilgore, Aaron Hernandez Suffered from Most Severe CTE Ever Found in a Person His Age,
WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/aaron-hernandez-suffered-from-mostsevere-cte-ever-found-in-a-person-his-age/2017/11/09/fa7cd204-c57b-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_story.html.
3
Ken Belson, Aaron Hernandez Had Severe C.T.E. When He Died at 27, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/sports/aaron-hernandez-cte-brain.html?mcubz=3.
4
Kilgore, supra note 2.
5
Id.
6
Belson, supra note 3; see also Kilgore, supra note 2 (“In a diagnosis that linked one of football’s most
notorious figures with the sport’s most significant health risk, doctors found Hernandez had Stage 3 CTE, which
researchers had never seen in a brain younger than 46 years old, McKee said.”).
7
Kilgore, supra note 2.
8
Rick Maese et al., NFL Says it Will ‘Vigorously’ Fight CTE Lawsuit Filed by Aaron Hernandez’s
Family, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/09/21/aaronhernandez-was-suffering-from-advanced-form-of-cte-family-files-suit-against-nfl/?utm_term=.1e5752b96c79.
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Patriots were aware of the neurological harm that would occur from repetitive
impact on the field but did not do enough to protect Hernandez from that harm.9
Hernandez’s complaint, insofar as it links CTE to NFL play, is nearly
identical to the complaint issued by a class of retired NFL players in In re
National Football League Players Concussion Injury Litigation, which the NFL
settled in 2016.10 The temporal relevance of Hernandez’s case reveals an
underlying question that all cases brought by NFL players after the 2016
settlement will also pose: did he assume the risk of CTE by continuing to play in
the face of nearly conclusive scientific evidence that it would result in his
eventual cognitive demise?11
This is the same question faced by plaintiffs when bringing suit against Big
Tobacco12 companies after the Surgeon General officially linked cigarettes and
cancer in 196413: did smokers assume the risk of lung cancer by continuing to
use tobacco in the face of scientific recommendation against doing so? This
overlapping legal question is not the only parallel between CTE and cigarettes,
as both public health crises arose following decades of denial by the responsible
industry (NFL and Big Tobacco, respectively) such that tobacco litigation
provides a useful template for projecting what the legal future of CTE claims
may look like.14 Although there is much we can learn from the history of Big

9

Belson, supra note 3.
In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2016) (stating
that “[f]ootball puts players at risk of repetitive brain trauma and injury because they suffer concussive and subconcussive hits during the game and at practice” and that “[p]laintiffs alleged that the NFL had a duty to provide
players with rules and information to protect them from the health risks—both short and long-term—of brain
injury[,]” including “a recently identified degenerative disease called chronic traumatic encephalopathy”).
11
Although Hernandez’s case is an imperfect illustration of this question, given that his three seasons of
NFL play (2010–2012) occurred prior to this landmark settlement and prior to the July 2017 Boston University
study revealing CTE in the brains of 110 of 111 former NFL players, his participation in the NFL did occur
amidst general public recognition and substantial scientific evidence linking football to CTE. See Jesse Mez et
al., Clinopathological Evaluation of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in Players of American Football, 318
JAMA 360, 362 (2017).
12
This term refers to the historically largest and most powerful tobacco companies in the United States:
Altria, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, Lorillard, and Philip Morris USA.
13
Tobacco companies continued to deny the link as late as 1998, however. Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From
Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond—A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 1334, 1340 (2001).
14
While there has been significant legislative and judicial action regarding concussions and neurotrauma
among youth and college athletes, this Comment focuses narrowly on the NFL context. The decision to do so is
one of precision, but also reflects the fact that NFL precedents and attitudes trickle down to lower, younger
levels of play such as the NCAA and Pop Warner. This is consistent with the proposal that the “way in which
player health is protected and promoted at the top echelons of the sport will influence policies, practices, and
culture all the way down the line, influencing the health not only of future NFL players but also the vastly larger
pool of Americans who will play football and never make it to the NFL.” Glenn Cohen et al., A Proposal to
10
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Tobacco litigation, critical distinctions also exist surrounding the CTE crisis
which must be taken into account.
This Comment argues that although the NFL responded to CTE litigation by
deploying the same strategies that proved successful for Big Tobacco, the
assumption of risk defense should not be applied to the NFL in the same way
that it was to the tobacco companies. In particular, it informs litigation strategy
by highlighting the unique social and structural pressures NFL plaintiffs face
such that they may prove successful against the assumption of risk defense
where tobacco litigation plaintiffs failed. To unpack these crucial distinctions,
this Comment begins in Part I by outlining the medical intricacies of CTE and
presenting a timeline of the NFL’s responses to developing connections between
football and CTE. Next, Part II unpacks the assumption of risk defense and how
it functions in the context of sports. This Part also provides a historic timeline
of tobacco litigation, with an emphasis on the eras in which Big Tobacco
successfully employed the assumption of risk defense. Finally, Part III discusses
the overlapping strategies between tobacco industry giants and the NFL, then
demonstrates how the NFL situation is different from tobacco litigation such that
the assumption of risk doctrine should not apply. This Part will close with
presentation and response to several counterarguments.
I.

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE AND CHRONIC TRAUMATIC
ENCEPHALOPATHY

Understanding the experiences of Aaron Hernandez and the hundreds of
other NFL players diagnosed with CTE requires a thorough examination of the
medical and historical contexts through which their debilitating neurological
disease arose. Accordingly, this Part provides the contextual framework in
which to situate the assumption of risk doctrine. First, section A offers a medical
overview of CTE, including its symptoms, diagnostic complications, and the
unique susceptibility of professional football players. Next, section B chronicles
how the NFL responded to an increasing body of scientific literature linking
CTE to football—from creating committees on concussion safety with the goal
of fostering confusion to rule changes that were largely symbolic and offered
little protection to athletes most at risk for CTE. Finally, it sketches the current
context of the CTE crisis, noting the minimal progress since the early 2000’s,
when traumatic brain injury first took the spotlight.

Address NFL Club Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest and to Promote Player Trust, 46 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S2, S6
(2016).
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A. Introduction to Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy
Chronic traumatic encephalopathy is a progressive neurological disease
found in people with a history of repeated brain trauma.15 First identified in 2002
following the autopsy of former Pittsburgh Steeler Mike Webster, CTE is similar
to dementia pugilistica (“punch-drunk syndrome”), a disease identified in
professional boxers since the 1920s.16 CTE presents clinically as dementia, with
symptoms including memory loss, confusion, impaired judgment, impulse
control problems, aggression, depression, suicidality, and parkinsonism.17
However, CTE is only diagnosable by postmortem brain scans, where it is
characterized by tangles of the abnormal protein tau near small blood vessels,
usually in deep folds of the cortex.18 Unlike a healthy brain, which sends healthy
cells to destroy proteins that form around affected areas following a brain
injury,19 a brain with CTE has so much protein buildup that the healthy cells are
overwhelmed and the blood vessels in the brain are essentially strangled.20
While CTE is often found in athletes who suffered multiple concussions
throughout the course of their careers, the principle cause of CTE is repeated
subconcussive head trauma: blows to the head that do not rise to the level of
concussion symptomology.21 This is evidenced by the 2010 autopsy of
University of Pennsylvania offensive lineman Owen Thomas, which revealed
severe CTE despite Thomas never being diagnosed with a concussion.22
Linemen, like Thomas, are most vulnerable to subconcussive trauma, as they
15
Frequently Asked Questions About Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, B.U. ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
CENT., https://www.bu.edu/alzresearch/ctecenter/chronic-traumatic-encephalopathy-faqs/ (last visited Nov. 25,
2018).
16
Stephanie A. Murray, Note, The Misnomer of the NFL’s “Concussion Crisis”: Don’t Count on the
NFL to Solve Football’s Biggest Problem—and OSHA Regulation May Not Save the Game Either, 56
WASHBURN L.J. 181, 186 (2017).
17
Frequently Asked Questions About Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, supra note 15. Parkinsonism
refers to symptoms of Parkinson disease that are caused by a different condition, including “tremors that occur
when muscles are relaxed, stiff muscles, slow movements, and problems with balance and walking.” Hector A.
Gonzalez-Usigli & Alberto Espay, Parkinsonism, MERCK MANUAL, https://www.merckmanuals.com/home/
brain,-spinal-cord,-and-nerve-disorders/movement-disorders/parkinsonism (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
18
Meredith Wadman, Ninety-nine Percent of Ailing NFL Player Brains Show Hallmarks of
Neurodegenerative Disease, Autopsy Study Finds, SCI. (Jul. 25, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://www.sciencemag.org/
news/2017/07/ninety-nine-percent-ailing-nfl-player-brains-show-hallmarks-neurodegenerative-disease.
19
Murray, supra note 16, at 185.
20
Sarah James, Note, Ringing the Bell for the Last Time: How the NFL’s Settlement Agreement
Overwhelmingly Disfavors NFL Players Living with Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE), 11 J. HEALTH
& BIOMED. L. 391, 398 (2016).
21
Murray, supra note 16, at 187.
22
Caleb Daniloff, CTE Found in Dead College Football Player: First Evidence of Brain Disease in
Athlete with No Concussions, BU TODAY (Sept. 14, 2010), https://www.bu.edu/today/2010/cte-found-in-deadcollege-football-player/.
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experience around 1,000 to 1,500 hits per year at a force averaging 20G or more
(“the equivalent to driving a car at 35 mph into a brick wall”).23 Thomas’ case
also emphasized how early CTE can begin, even without a history of
documented concussions.24
Also medically relevant to the CTE conversation is second impact syndrome,
a condition that occurs when an athlete returns to play before resolving
symptoms of a prior concussion.25 When a concussed athlete returns to play
before full recovery, his brain is in a particularly vulnerable state and could
fatally herniate upon receiving even a trivial second blow.26
B. Timeline of CTE Scientific Developments and NFL Responses27
The NFL has been on notice of the possible connection between head injury
on the field and debilitating neurological damage since 1952, when an article
published in the New England Journal of Medicine recommended the NFL
implement a “three-strike rule” wherein a player must retire after suffering three
career concussions.28 However, the modern era in the NFL concussion
conversation did not begin until 2002, ushered in by the autopsy of former
Pittsburgh Steeler “Iron” Mike Webster. While Webster’s official cause of death
was heart attack,29 stories of his fall from fame to madness (including fits of
rage, memory loss, the habit of leaving unintelligible notes, and tazing himself
to fall asleep) prompted Nigerian pathologist Bennet Omalu to closely examine
Webster’s brain.30
What Omalu discovered were clusters of tau protein, typically found among
boxers and elderly individuals but unprecedented for someone Webster’s age,

23

James, supra note 20, at 392 n.1.
Daniloff, supra note 22.
25
Daniel J. Kain, Note, “It’s Just a Concussion”: The National Football League’s Denial of a Causal
Link Between Multiple Concussions and Later-Life Cognitive Decline, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 697, 702 (2009).
26
Mitch Koczerginski, Who Is at Fault When a Concussed Athlete Returns to Action?, 47 VAL. U. L.
REV. 63, 63 n.2 (2012).
27
See generally Lauren Ezell, Timeline: The NFL’s Concussion Crisis, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 8, 2013,
9:57 PM), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/league-of-denial/timeline-the-nfls-concussioncrisis (providing a dual chronology timeline, with one column outlining scientific concern about the link between
football and brain disease and another column including the NFL’s public statements on the issue from 1994 to
2013).
28
James, supra note 20, at 405 n.51.
29
Kain, supra note 25, at 734 n.218.
30
See generally MARK FAINARU-WADA & STEVE FAINARU, LEAGUE OF DENIAL: THE NFL,
CONCUSSIONS, AND THE BATTLE FOR TRUTH 14–30, 46–62 (2013) (providing an overview of Webster’s rise,
legacy, and fall).
24
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just fifty.31 In 2005, Omalu published his findings in Neurosurgery, claiming
that Webster’s brain damage had been caused by “‘repetitive concussive brain
injury’ from playing football.”32 As the first to formally evidence the link
between football and CTE, Omalu sparked a firestorm from the NFL and a slew
of other neuropathological studies by independent scientists.33 Over the next five
years, evidence supporting the connection between CTE and football mounted,
including the results of several more autopsies by Omalu (those of Terry Long34
and Andre Waters)35 and the work of CTE’s new leading lady, Dr. Ann McKee
of Boston University (B.U.). McKee’s research emphasized “[t]here is
overwhelming evidence that [CTE] is the result of repeated sublethal brain
trauma.”36
The NFL responded by denying and discrediting Omalu’s findings. After
calling for Omalu to retract his article in Neurosurgery, the NFL’s Mild
Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI) Committee37 accelerated their own publication
efforts. By exploiting industry connections, the MTBI Committee circumvented
the normal peer review process38 and published sixteen articles between 2003
and 2009 in that very same journal.39 “The MTBI Committee’s research [by and
large] claimed that concussion rates in the NFL were extremely low, that the
number of concussions suffered by a player bears no relation to future injuries,
and[] that there is no link between football and brain damage.”40 Most
importantly, the MTBI Committee’s research was used to support a 2007 NFL
press release of concussion protocol, which purported that (1) there is no

31

Murray, supra note 16.
Christopher R. Deubert et al., Protecting and Promoting the Health of NFL Players: Legal and Ethical
Analysis and Recommendations, 7 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 176 (2016).
33
Joseph M. Hanna & Daniel Kain, NFL’s Shaky Concussion Policy Exposes the League to Potential
Liability Headaches, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 9, 9 (2010).
34
FAINARU-WADA & FAINARU, supra note 30, at 193–94.
35
Hanna & Kain, supra note 33; see also Jarryd Werts, Note, Ringing the Bell on Concussions: The Rise
of Head Injuries and Cognitive Decline in Football Players, and the NFL’s Obligation to Improve Safety
Measures, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 173, 175 (2012).
36
Hanna & Kain, supra note 33 (emphasis omitted).
37
The NFL founded the MTBI Committee in 1994 in response to growing awareness surrounding the
dangerousness of head injury on the field. Murray, supra note 16, at 189. However, the committee was chaired
by a rheumatologist (the New York Jets club doctor, Elliot Pellman) and included only one neurosurgeon with
previous ties to the NFL and one neurologist, further calling their research and recommendations into question.
Deubert et al., supra note 32, at 175–76.
38
See FAINARU-WADA & FAINARU, supra note 30, at 6 (“The league used that journal, which some
researchers would come to ridicule as the ‘Journal of No NFL Concussions,’ to publish an unprecedented series
of papers, several of which were rejected by peer reviewers and editors and later disavowed even by some of
their own authors.”).
39
Deubert et al., supra note 32.
40
Id. at 177.
32
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evidence that “having more than one or two concussions leads to permanent
problems if each injury is managed properly”; (2) “there is no ‘magic number’
for how many concussions is too many”; and (3) “[p]layers should not be at a
greater risk of further injury once they receive proper medical care for a
concussion and are free of symptoms.”41
Wary of the NFL’s tactics in the face of mounting scientific evidence, a 2009
House Judiciary Committee hearing on brain injury and player safety called in
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell.42 During the hearing, Goodell diminished
the independent studies and instead emphasized the NFL’s commitment to
research and education on brain injuries, new guidelines for return to play, and
increased benefits for former players.43
Bad press and congressional pressure after the 2009 hearing necessitated an
overhaul by the NFL that was nearly a decade overdue.44 The NFL renamed the
MTBI Committee to the “Head, Neck and Spine Committee” and hired
prominent neurologists with no prior NFL ties to chair the Committee.45 They
also paired with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to
generate a locker room poster, which made no mention of CTE, but instead
stated:
[T]raumatic brain injury can cause a wide range of short or long-term
changes affecting thinking, sensation, language, or emotions. These
changes may lead to problems with memory and communication,
personality changes, as well as depression and early onset of dementia.
Concussions and conditions resulting from repeated brain injury can
change your life and your family’s life forever.46

This era also ushered in an explosion of rule changes by the NFL,47 nearly
all of which protected players in marquee positions such as receivers from
incurring the drastic, stars-around-the-head type of concussions, which, though

41
J. Brad Reich, When “Getting Your Bell Rung” May Lead to “Ringing the Bell”: Potential
Compensation for NFL Player Concussion-Related Injuries, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 198, 201 (2013)
(emphasis omitted).
42
Hanna & Kain, supra note 33, at 9–10.
43
Deubert et al., supra note 32, at 177.
44
Koczerginski, supra note 26, at 75.
45
Deubert et al., supra note 32, at 178 (“According to Mitch Berger, a prominent San Francisco
neurosurgeon who joined the Committee at that time, the Committee ‘essentially started from zero.’”).
46
Hanna & Kain, supra note 33, at 14.
47
See generally Werts, supra note 35, at 195 (discussing rule changes designed to prevent head injuries
and protect particular positions, stating that “additional changes to the return-to-play policy were likely a result
of the hearings before the House Judiciary Committee in 2009 regarding the NFL’s handling of brain injuries”).
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problematic, are not the principal cause of CTE.48 Further, they prompted
inclusion of a neuro-disability benefit to the 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement,49 supplementing the “Section 88” plan that, under the 2006
Collective Bargaining Agreement, afforded former players up to $88,000 a year
for medical claims related to dementia.50
While it seemed as though the NFL was taking a step in the direction of
transparency, safety, and responsibility, the April 2016 class action In re
National Football League Players Concussion Injury Litigation halted this
trend. In this case, which ended in settlement, retired football players alleged
that the NFL failed to take reasonable actions to protect players from chronic
risks created by head injuries, and concealed those risks from players.51
However, the settlement failed to include CTE in a list of diagnoses for which
players could recover. Families of players who died with CTE from 2009 to
2014 can recover millions, but the hundreds of players who will presumptively
die with CTE outside that narrow date range cannot recover anything.52 Instead
of mentioning CTE, the settlement agreement included (1) a $75 million
Baseline Assessment Program that provides eligible retired players with free
baseline assessment examinations of their objective neurological functioning;
(2) an uncapped, sixty-five year Monetary Award Fund that provides
compensation for retired players who submit proof of certain diagnoses; and (3)
a $10 million Education Fund to instruct football players about head injury
prevention.53
The deficiencies of the settlement are particularly relevant in light of the July
2017 study by researchers at B.U. published in the esteemed Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA), which revealed evidence of CTE in
99% (110 of 111) of studied brains from former NFL players.54 The B.U. study
concluded that “players of . . . [f]ootball may be at increased risk of long-term

48
See Malcolm Gladwell, Offensive Play: How Different are Dogfighting and Football?, NEW YORKER
(Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/19/offensive-play.
49
Deubert et al., supra note 32, at 180–82.
50
See id. at 181–82 (illustrating the NFL’s responsibility to fund both the Neuro-Cognitive Disability
Benefit and “The 88 Plan (2006)” in the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement); see also Kain, supra note 25,
at 726 (describing the “Section 88” plan).
51
821 F.3d 410, 421–25 (3d Cir. 2016).
52
James, supra note 20, at 409–10; see also Dom Cosentino, The NFL Concussion Settlement Keeps
Failing People It’s Supposed to Help, DEADSPIN (June 29, 2018, 4:26 PM), https://deadspin.com/the-nflconcussion-settlement-keeps-failing-people-its-1827239759 (reporting instance of former NFL player’s family
missing deadline to file CTE diagnosis and having lawsuit dismissed).
53
James, supra note 20, at 416–18.
54
See Mez et al., supra note 11.
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neurological conditions, particularly [CTE].”55 This study represents the most
conclusive and comprehensive analysis of brain trauma among football players
in nearly thirty years. Its closest predecessor was a cohort study that focused on
neurodegenerative causes of death among NFL players.56 That cohort study
followed 3,439 NFL players with at least five pension-credited seasons from
1959 through 1988, and concluded that “the neurodegenerative mortality [of this
cohort] is [three] times higher than that of the general [U.S.] population . . . .
These results are consistent with recent studies that suggest an increased risk of
neurodegenerative disease among football players.”57 While the 2017 B.U. study
has a markedly smaller sample size, composed only of brains donated by family
members who may have done so because they had reason to suspect CTE, it is
the largest scale study of football players to focus exclusively on CTE as
opposed to depression or other neurological diseases.58 Other studies have
demonstrated the correlation between the rate of depression and concussions
sustained by former NFL players59 and discovered increased problems with
behavioral regulation, apathy, and executive function among athletes who began
playing tackle football before the age of twelve.60
The NFL has not issued a formal response to the B.U. study, continuing
instead to spend more money and introduce more safety technologies in hopes
of preserving the game. In 2012, the NFL donated a $30 million “unrestricted
gift” to the National Institutes of Health in support of brain injury research, but
later tried to improperly divert those funds from use in developing a CTE test
for living players.61 In 2013, the NFL paired with General Electric and Under
Armour to launch the Head Health Challenge, a program that awards $60 million
in total grant money for research and development of head injury solutions.62

55

Id. at 369.
Everett J. Lehman et al., Neurodegenerative Causes of Death Among Retired National Football League
Players, 79 NEUROLOGY 1970, 1971 (2012) (describing 2012 study on mortality from neurodegenerative
conditions among NFL players).
57
Id. at 1971–72.
58
Wadman, supra note 18; see Alexandra Sifferlin, Degenerative Brain Disease Found in 87% of Former
Football Players: Study, TIME (July 25, 2017), http://time.com/4871597/degenerative-brain-disease-ctefootball/.
59
Werts, supra note 35, at 179–80.
60
Ken Belson, Playing Tackle Football Before 12 Is Tied to Brain Problems Later, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/19/sports/football/tackle-football-brain-youth.html.
61
Erin Schumaker, What You Need to Know About CTE This NFL Season, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29,
2017, 5:26 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nfl-cte_us_57d03775e4b06a74c9f1e8f1 (quoting a
House Energy and Commerce Committee report stating that “[t]he NFL attempted to use its ‘unrestricted gift’
as leverage to steer funding away from one of its critics”).
62
Daniel Roberts, Here’s How the NFL Might Combat Concussions, FORTUNE (Dec. 31, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/12/31/nfl-concussion-technology/; see also Ben Liebenberg, What is the Head Health
56
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Funded proposals include blast-resistant mats that underlie the turf to soften
impact and a rate-dependent strap that prevents the head from snapping back
abruptly after a hard hit.63 Other concussion-reducing technologies include the
Gladiator Helmet, esteemed for a soft exterior comprised of reaction-molded
polyurethane, a material similar to that used in car bumpers,64 and Riddell
Sports’ HITS (Head Impact Telemetry System).65 HITS is a series of sensors
placed inside helmets that measures the force and location of every blow to the
head, allowing trainers and researchers to analyze possible injuries in real time.66
So far, HITS data suggests that the cumulative exposure to head trauma during
practices (approximately 1000 hits per season for an average NFL lineman) is
as dangerous as exposure during games and should be the new focus of traumatic
brain injury prevention efforts.67 However, expansion of technology is
ultimately counterintuitive to the goal of protecting player health, because it
breeds a sense of invulnerability and encourages athletes to play more
recklessly.68
Thus, in 2018, the current landscape of the NFL concussion debate is
marginally different than it was in the days of Mike Webster. Despite the NFL
publicly acknowledging in 2009 that concussions can have long-term effects,69
and a top league official admitting in 2016 that there is a link between CTE and
football,70 those admissions are a flash in the pan and do not indicate a shift in
attitudes inside the NFL. In fact, in April of 2018, the NFL selected Nicholas
Theodore—a Johns Hopkins neurosurgeon who co-authored a 2016 paper,
entitled Football and Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy: How Much Evidence
Actually Exists?, to chair the Head, Neck and Spine Committee.71 Thus, while
active participants can almost guarantee their eventual development of CTE, any
NFL response to research that runs counter to its business interests is still a day
Initiative?, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE: PLAY SMART, PLAY SAFE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.
playsmartplaysafe.com/focus-on-safety/advanced-technology/head-health-initiative/.
63
Roberts, supra note 62.
64
Ben McGrath, Does Football Have a Future?: The N.F.L. and the Concussion Crisis, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 31, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/31/does-football-have-a-future.
65
Koczerginski, supra note 26, at 94–95.
66
See McGrath, supra note 64.
67
See Gladwell, supra note 48.
68
McGrath, supra note 64.
69
Alan Schwarz, N.F.L. Acknowledges Long-Term Concussion Effects, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/sports/football/21concussions.html.
70
Ken Belson, N.F.L. Official Affirms Link Between Playing Football and C.T.E., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/sports/football/nfl-official-affirms-link-with-cte.html.
71
Rick Maese, New Head of NFL Safety Committee Posed Question About CTE in 2016 Paper, WASH.
POST (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2018/04/19/new-head-of-nfl-safetycommittee-questioned-cte-in-2016-paper.

PAOLINI_FINALPROOFS2

2019]

1/30/2019 1:31 PM

ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN THE CTE CRISIS

619

late and a dollar short. Most importantly, the NFL has yet to explicitly accept
that “CTE is a very real consequence of an NFL career.”72
II. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
With this historical context in mind, a salient question arises: did
professional football players assume the risk of CTE by choosing to continue
playing despite evidence of near-certain neurological harm? Addressing this
question, this Part unpacks the assumption of risk doctrine, its historical use by
Big Tobacco, and its application in sports torts cases. First, section A provides a
definitional introduction to the doctrine, including instances where it can be
overridden. Next, section B outlines how tobacco companies applied assumption
of risk during three waves of tobacco litigation, highlighting the contexts in
which it was most successful. Finally, section C addresses assumption of risk in
the sports context and identifies criteria for defendants to avoid liability in sports
torts cases.
A. Introduction to the Doctrine
Assumption of the risk is a fundamental tort defense that functions as a
complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery.73 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
defines the general principle of assumption of risk: “A plaintiff who voluntarily
assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the
defendant cannot recover for such harm.”74 Traditionally, a defendant must
make out two elements for the defense to apply.75 First, he or she must prove
that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the danger involved and appreciation
for its magnitude.76 Second, he or she must prove that the plaintiff nonetheless
voluntarily proceeded in the face of the known risk.77 The defense will be
overridden if the court finds that the plaintiff’s assumption of a given risk was
not fully informed, not fully voluntary, or not adequately particularized.78
The doctrine is subdivided into express and implied assumption of risk in
previous sections of the Restatement. Express assumption of risk occurs when
72
Thomas A. Drysdale, Helmet-to-Helmet Contact: Avoiding a Lifetime Penalty by Creating a Duty to
Scan Active NFL Players for Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 425, 426 (2013).
73
Keya Denner, Taking One for the Team: The Role of Assumption of the Risk in Sports Torts Cases, 14
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 209, 210 (2004).
74
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
75
Denner, supra note 73, at 210–11.
76
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D.
77
Id. § 496E.
78
Id. § 496D–E reporter’s note.
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“a plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to accept a risk of
harm arising from the defendant’s negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover
for such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.”79
Correspondingly, implied assumption of risk occurs when a plaintiff voluntarily
enters into a relationship with a defendant that involves a known risk of potential
injury and, in doing so, tacitly relieves the defendant of a duty of care otherwise
owed to the plaintiff.80
Implied assumption of risk can be further dissected into primary and
secondary based on the relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Implied
primary assumption of risk occurs when the parties are co-participants in the
activity that causes harm, such as hockey players on the ice.81 On the other hand,
implied secondary assumption of risk arises when, “due to a special relationship”
between the two parties, the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care, typically
found in coaches, schools, or organizations.82
While assumption of risk is traditionally a complete defense, many states
have absorbed implied assumption of risk into a comparative negligence theory
of analysis.83 Under this theory, total recovery is reduced relative to the
culpability of the plaintiff.84 In cases involving professional sports, the
plaintiff’s level of “negligent contribution to his own injuries turns on his
knowledge of the risk he assumes by participating.”85
B. The Doctrine as Employed in Tobacco Litigation
1. Introduction
Assumption of risk was a popular defense for Big Tobacco companies during
decades of litigation concerning the health consequences of smoking cigarettes.
Legal scholars divide the history of tobacco litigation into three temporal waves,
delineated by the prevailing plaintiff legal theory employed in each.86 Each
successive wave arose in response to strategic failures from the prior era and
relied on scientific and contextual developments surrounding the addictive and

79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. § 496B.
Id. § 496C.
Denner, supra note 73, at 213–14.
See id. at 216.
Koczerginski, supra note 26, at 93.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1338.
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carcinogenic characteristics of cigarettes.87 Thus, each preceding wave
constituted a cautionary tale and produced a changing legal climate within which
the next wave could occur.88
2. First Wave (1950s–1960s)
Although the first reports connecting smoking cigarettes to cancer were
published in 1950, litigation against Big Tobacco companies in the United States
did not begin until 1954, after a 1953 Reader’s Digest report made it common
knowledge among the American populace that smoking could kill.89 During the
first wave, about 150 cases were filed, where plaintiffs brought claims of deceit,
breach of warranty, and negligence, but only ten made it to trial.90
In both the trial and pretrial phases, individual plaintiffs were unprepared for
the myriad of defenses prepared by Big Tobacco.91 In cases that did go to trial,
tobacco companies relied on foreseeability, asserting that without evidence that
the seller knew the product would cause harm, the seller could not be held liable
for breach of warranty.92 Even if juries concluded that smoker deaths were
caused by the tobacco company’s product, plaintiffs were incapable of
supporting the stance that tobacco companies knew their product could and
would cause smokers to contract cancer.93 Tobacco companies also successfully
employed the “king of the mountain” strategy, leveraging their vast financial
advantage by filing motion after motion, taking countless depositions, and
pursuing every legal avenue, with the goal of bankrupting their opponent during
lengthy pretrial stages.94 Other defense strategies included outright denial that
tobacco was harmful, proposing that plaintiffs’ “cancer was caused by other
factors[,]” and arguing that “smokers assumed the risk of [harm] when they
decided to smoke.”95
87
See Kathleen Michon, Tobacco Litigation: History and Recent Developments, NOLO, https://www.
nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/tobacco-litigation-history-and-development-32202.html (last visited Nov. 25,
2018).
88
See generally CLIVE BATES & ANDY ROWELL, TOBACCO EXPLAINED: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE
TOBACCO INDUSTRY . . . IN ITS OWN WORDS 1–12, http://www.who.int/tobacco/media/en/TobaccoExplained.
pdf (presenting a blow-by-blow account of scientific research and industry responses from the 1960s to present).
89
Tucker S. Player, Note, After the Fall: The Cigarette Papers, the Global Settlement, and the Future of
Tobacco Litigation, 49 S.C. L. REV. 311, 312–13 (1998).
90
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1338–39.
91
See Ingrid L. Dietsch Field, Comment, No Ifs, Ands or Butts: Big Tobacco Is Fighting for Its Life
Against a New Breed of Plaintiffs Armed with Mounting Evidence, 27 U. BALT. L. REV 99, 101 (1997).
92
Player, supra note 89, at 313.
93
Dietsch Field, supra note 91, at 105.
94
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1339.
95
Michon, supra note 87.
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With a wide range of defenses available and a clear financial advantage,
tobacco companies were uniformly victorious during the first wave.96 The end
of the first era was marked by publication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
which essentially codified the popular tobacco company defense by
commenting: “[g]ood tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the
effects of smoking may be harmful.”97
3. Second Wave (1980s)
Several contextual developments contributed to plaintiffs’ new litigation
strategies in the 1980s. The most influential developments came in 1964, with
the Surgeon General’s report that smoking was “incontrovertibly a threat to
health,” leading to the Cigarette Acts of 1965 and 1969.98 The 1965 Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, as the first congressional response to
the Surgeon General’s report, required manufacturers to place warning labels on
cigarette packages that read, “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous
to Your Health.”99 Correspondingly, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
of 1969 banned all cigarette advertising on radio and television.100
Plaintiffs’ attorneys in this wave crafted legal strategies in response not only
to contextual developments, but also to failures from the first wave.101 First, to
remedy the “king of the mountain” problem, they pooled resources.102 Second,
to combat the tobacco companies’ foreseeability claim, they shifted from breach
of warranty to strict tort liability. Strict tort liability allowed plaintiffs to
emphasize the unreasonably dangerous nature of the product without needing to
prove foreseeability.103 Specifically, plaintiffs utilized risk-utility theory,
wherein a manufacturer is liable when injuries caused by its product outweigh
the beneficial effects of said product.104 When applied to tobacco cases, this
meant weighing the limited pleasure of smoking against the resulting health care
costs.105 Third, to bypass the assumption of risk defense, plaintiffs relied on the
developing doctrine of comparative fault and argued addiction.106 Comparative

96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

See Dietsch Field, supra note 91.
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1340.
Id.
Id.; see also Player, supra note 89, at 315.
Player, supra note 89, at 315.
Id.
Id.
Dietsch Field, supra note 91, at 107.
Player, supra note 89, at 315.
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1341.
Player, supra note 89, at 317.
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fault allowed partial recovery in instances of shared negligence, so although
plaintiffs assumed some risk in deciding to smoke, they asserted that tobacco
companies also shared in responsibility.107 The argument that addiction
precluded plaintiffs’ autonomous capacity for choice was bolstered by the 1988
classification of nicotine as an addictive substance by the Surgeon General.108
In response, tobacco companies continued their efforts to elongate the
pretrial period but now incorporated preemption alongside their characteristic
“king of the mountain” tactics.109 This defense was strengthened by reference to
the Cigarette Acts of 1965 and 1969, which courts found “impliedly preempted
state tort claims based on the duty to warn” because they ensured consumers’
knowledge of the dangerousness of cigarettes.110 A notable illustration of
preemption in the second wave was the landmark case Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., in which the Third Circuit reversed a jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs on the grounds that all common law damage claims were preempted.111
Tobacco companies also leveraged application of the consumer expectations
test, under which a plaintiff cannot recover if he or she knew the product was
harmful to his or her health.112 Further, they successfully advocated in many
states for “common knowledge” statutes, requiring courts to apply the consumer
expectations test.113 On the limited chance that a case made it to trial, tobacco
companies also engaged in “character assassination” of plaintiffs, emphasizing
personal shortcomings in light of their choice to engage in the demonstrably
dangerous practice of smoking.114
Big Tobacco also sought to counter the Surgeon General’s report by creating
its own industry research group, the Council on Tobacco Research, which
published studies disputing any connection between smoking and illness.115
Combined with the ongoing successes of assumption of risk doctrine, the “king
of the mountain” strategy, and preemption defense, tobacco companies were as
overwhelmingly successful in the second wave as they had been in the first.116

107

Id. at 317–18.
SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION iii (1988).
109
Player, supra note 89, at 318.
110
Dietsch Field, supra note 91, at 110.
111
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1342–43.
112
Player, supra note 89, at 317.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 316.
115
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1340–41.
116
Id. at 1340.
108
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4. Third Wave (1990s—Present)
The third wave was ushered in by an explosion of information exposing the
tobacco industry’s awareness of the addictive qualities of their product and
potential harm to users’ health. First, in 1994 came the “Cigarette Papers,” the
quintessential smoking gun document that proved that tobacco companies had
affirmative knowledge since the 1960s that nicotine was addictive and that
tobacco use directly linked to cancer.117 Soon after, in 1997, the Liggett Group,
a small tobacco company on the brink of bankruptcy, offered to settle with
states’ attorneys general, including assisting in discovery proceedings against
non-settling tobacco companies and effectively opening the floodgates on
decades of industry secrets.118
Yet, it was not only the magnitude of tobacco industry knowledge that
changed in the third wave, plaintiffs themselves changed too. While suits in prior
eras were typically brought by pioneer plaintiffs and “frontiersmen,” or lone
personal injury attorneys,119 the third era was characterized by class actions,
state actions, and “blameless”120 non-smoking plaintiffs. The first tobacco class
action lawsuit, Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., was filed in 1993, on
behalf of “all nicotine dependent people in the United States,” and supported by
over sixty law firms.121 While this case did not go to trial, it paved the way for
the application of newly incriminating information about the tobacco industry in
the interest of millions of smokers.
State actions also arose around this time, beginning in 1994 when
Mississippi sued to recover Medicaid funds used to treat smoking-related
illnesses as a result of the tremendous burden cigarettes placed on its public
health system.122 Following suit, over forty states brought antitrust and
consumer protection suits,123 successfully avoiding the problem of a
“blameworthy plaintiff”124—one responsible for his own ill health by deciding
to smoke—and refocusing attention on the bad conduct of Big Tobacco.125

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Player, supra note 89, at 322.
Id. at 329.
Dietsch Field, supra note 91, at 114.
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1343–47.
Dietsch Field, supra note 91, at 115.
Id. at 116–17.
Michon, supra note 87.
Dietsch Field, supra note 91, at 119.
Id.
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Ultimately, state claims by forty-six states126 were settled in 1998 via the Master
Settlement Agreement, pursuant to which four of the largest tobacco companies
agreed to refrain from marketing to children, pay annual sums totaling $206
billion to compensate states for tobacco-related health costs, create and fund the
National Public Education Foundation with the mission of reducing youth
smoking, and dissolve three of the biggest tobacco industry organizations.127
Alongside states, another example of “blameless plaintiffs” from the third
wave were persons affected by secondhand smoke. Similar to states, the tobacco
industry could not use their freedom of choice or assumption of risk defense
against these plaintiffs because they suffered health consequences of tobacco yet
did not “willingly expose[] themselves to harm.”128 One such group was a class
of 60,000 flight attendants who did not themselves smoke but nonetheless
became ill due to smoke they inhaled on the job.129 By banding together to
finally quell the financial disparities of earlier eras, and structuring recovery
theories that shifted attention to newly exposed scandals of the tobacco industry
and away from individual smokers’ choices, plaintiffs finally prevailed over
tobacco companies in the 1990s.130
Another recent development in the history of tobacco litigation is a 2006
Florida Supreme Court decision to decertify a class of 700,000 smokers and their
families, necessitating each case be litigated and proven on an individual
basis.131 Plaintiffs who chose to bring claims after decertification of the class are
referred to as “Engle Progeny” after the Miami Beach pediatrician, Howard
Engle, who initially filed the class action suit in 1994.132 As of June 15, 2015,
63.8% of the 141 verdicts issued in Engle Progeny trials were for the plaintiffs,
while 36.2% were issued in favor of tobacco companies. However, many of
126
The four states who did not partake in the Master Settlement were Minnesota, Mississippi, Texas, and
Florida, all of whom previously negotiated their own settlements, totaling over $40 billion collectively. Jensen,
supra note 13, at 1335 n.1.
127
Id. at 1335; see also David M. Cutler et al., The Economic Impacts of the Tobacco Settlement, 21 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS MGMT. 1, 4 (2001); Walter J. Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, The Master Settlement Agreement
and Its Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years Later: Lessons for Physicians About Health Policy Making, 137 CHEST
692, 692–97 (2010) (analyzing impact of Master Settlement Agreement and offering the common critique that
it was too generous to Big Tobacco).
128
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1343.
129
Dietsch Field, supra note 91, at 115.
130
Jensen, supra note 13, at 1343–47 (“As the truth about cigarette makers came to light, juries no longer
viewed smokers as the only culpable party, but saw them rather as victims of a manipulative and deceptive
industry.”).
131
Michon, supra note 87.
132
Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, What is the “Engle Progeny” Litigation?, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR.,
http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-engle-progeny-2015.pdf (last visited
Nov. 25, 2018).
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these verdicts are in the appeals process.133 The results of the Engle Progeny
cases appear to represent the general trend toward Big Tobacco losses in the
current decade, as companies like R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris attempt to
ward off age-old claims brought by new plaintiffs. For example, the federal
government filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act
suit against Philip Morris and eight other tobacco companies in 2000, alleging
that they had engaged in a conspiracy to conceal evidence about the addictive
nature of cigarettes.134 The initial suit was resolved in favor of the federal
government, but appeals and ongoing litigation in the same case have continued
into 2018.135
While persisting in the fight against old claims, Big Tobacco companies
have simultaneously turned their attention to a new frontier: looming e-cigarette
litigation. After the FDA issued a final “deeming rule” in May 2016, extending
the FDA’s regulatory authority over tobacco products to include electronic
nicotine delivery systems, such as e-cigarettes, as well as other new products
designed for the delivery of nicotine,136 tobacco companies have questioned the
constitutionality of the rule137 and begun to push back on compliance deadlines
set for 2019.138
C. The Doctrine as Applied to Sports Torts
In a sports context, the general assumption of risk doctrine applied is “that
athletes generally assume the risk of sports injuries that are the known, apparent,

133
Id. at 4 (“Many of these verdicts were appealed and some were overturned, reduced, remanded for
further proceedings, or dismissed.”).
134
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 801 F.3d 250, 252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Fifteen years ago,
the United States filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that Philip Morris
and eight other cigarette manufacturers violated the [RICO Act], 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, by engaging in a then
still-ongoing conspiracy to deceive the American public about the health consequences and addictiveness of
smoking cigarettes.”).
135
See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d. 131 (D.D.C. 2018) (illustrating that
litigation on this particular case has continued well into 2018); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2006) (delivering the district court’s initial verdict in favor of plaintiffs).
136
The full title of the final rule is as follows: “Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act;
Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco
Purposes; Final Rule.” 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 1140, 1143 (2016).
137
Hoban v. FDA, No. 18-269, 2018 WL 3122341, at *1 (D. Minn. June 26, 2016) (“On January 30, 2018,
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants challenging the constitutionality of the FDA’s ‘deeming rule.’”).
138
See Tobacco Control Legal Consortium, U.S. E-Cigarette Regulation: A 50-State Review, PUB.
HEALTH L. CTR. , http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/E-Cigarette-Legal-Landscape-50State-Review-September-2018.pdf (last updated Sept. 15, 2018).
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and reasonably foreseeable consequences of athletic participation.”139 As Judge
Cardozo famously posited:
One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it
so far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the
risk of a thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance
of contact with the ball.140

A similar sentiment was expressed in Turcotte v. Fell, where the court held that
“[i]f a participant [in a sporting event] makes an informed estimate of the risks
involved in the activity and willingly undertakes them, then there can be no
liability if he is injured as a result of those risks.”141 Both quotes speak to implied
assumption of risk, although it is notable that defendants can avoid liability in
sports torts cases if either (1) “the plaintiff has expressly relieved the defendant
of liability” or (2) “if the injury was caused by a risk inherent in the activity.”142
III. COMPARABLE AND CONTRASTING STRATEGIES AND SUCCESSES
Given the contextual background on both the NFL and Big Tobacco, two
industries burdened by possible responsibility for causing public health
epidemics, this Part contemplates the usefulness of Big Tobacco as a predictive
template for future NFL litigation. To do so, section A compares the two,
outlining three strategies used by both Big Tobacco and the NFL when faced
with condemning research and public outcry. However, to show that these
similarities are not determinative of how CTE cases will or should turn out,
section B offers contrast. This section demonstrates three unique pressures and
structures faced by NFL players and argues that these differences are sufficient
for CTE plaintiffs to succeed against an assumption of risk defense in instances
where tobacco plaintiffs failed. Finally, section C includes several
counterarguments to the assertion that the NFL situation is sufficiently different
from the tobacco situation such that players will overcome an assumption of risk
defense, and responses to those counterarguments.

139
Alexander N. Hecht, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sports-Related Concussions: The Merril Hoge Story,
12 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 17, 32 (2002).
140
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, J.).
141
502 N.E.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. 1986).
142
Alexander J. Drago, Assumption of Risk: An Age-Old Defense Still Viable in Sports and Recreation
Cases, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 583, 608 (2002).
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A. Overlapping Strategies
To avoid and confront litigation surrounding head injury on the field and
neurodegenerative health, the NFL borrowed three strategies from the tobacco
industry playbook: (1) denial; (2) creation of independent research groups to
conduct and publish research that protected its business interests; and (3)
emphasizing personal responsibility. Dr. Joseph Maroon, the team neurosurgeon
for the Pittsburgh Steelers and infamous CTE naysayer,143 described the NFL’s
reaction to the reality of brain damage into stages: “active resistance and passive
resistance, shifting to passive acceptance and, finally, in the past few months,
active acceptance.”144
Denial is the most salient of these stages and is the one that prompted
Representative Linda Sanchez of California to analogize the NFL to Big
Tobacco in a 2009 hearing in the House Judiciary Committee.145 In her remarks
to NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell about the causal link between concussions
and cognitive decline, Representative Sanchez stated: “It sort of reminds me of
the tobacco companies pre-90s when they kept saying ‘No, there’s no link
between smoking and damage to your health’ . . . and they were forced to admit
that that was incorrect through a spate of litigation in the 1990s.”146 Sanchez is
referring to the fact that tobacco executives denied the addictiveness of nicotine
as late as 1994,147 when the Cigarette Papers revealed executives had been aware
of the addictive nature of nicotine since the 1960s.148 For the NFL, aside from
indirect concessions (such as through the 2009 locker room poster149 and
granting benefits for mental disability from football head trauma),150 and an
isolated comment in 2016 by Jeff Miller, Senior Vice President of Health and
Safety Policy,151 the institution has chronically denied any connection between

143
Ryan Van Bibber, The Doctor Who Says CTE Is “Exaggerated” Hid NFL Affiliation in Published
Study, SBNATION (July 24, 2015, 1:53 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/7/24/9031863/nfl-concussionscte-doctor-conflict-of-interest.
144
McGrath, supra note 64.
145
Koczerginski, supra note 26, at 75 n.68.
146
Football Player Head Injuries, C-SPAN (Oct. 28, 2009), https://www.c-span.org/video/?2896851/football-player-head-injuries (quote transcribed from video).
147
David S. Cerra, Unringing the Bell: Former Players Sue NFL and Helmet Manufacturers over
Concussion Risks in Maxwell v. NFL, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 265, 286 (2012).
148
Player, supra note 89, at 322.
149
Hanna & Kain, supra note 33, at 14 & n.100.
150
Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, NFL Board Paid $2M to Players While League Denied FootballConcussion Link, PBS FRONTLINE (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/nfl-board-paid2m-to-players-while-league-denied-football-concussion-link/.
151
Belson, supra note 70.
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football and CTE.152 NFL executives also denied ever working alongside
tobacco companies in lobbying efforts153 after a New York Times investigative
piece accused them of sharing lawyers, lobbyists, and consultants with Big
Tobacco.154
Representative Sanchez also brought up the second overlapping strategy
between the NFL and Big Tobacco during the same 2009 congressional hearing,
when she accused the NFL of “muddying the waters through private studies.”155
Just as tobacco companies created and funded the Tobacco Industry Research
Committee, responsible for publishing and disseminating material to confuse the
populace about the dangers of cigarettes and addictive qualities of nicotine,156
the NFL created the MTBI Committee to publish academic material protecting
their product: professional football.157 While on the surface both research groups
utilized scientific methodologies to reach different conclusions than the
scientific canon of the time, their research practices have come into question.158
A 2016 New York Times investigation revealed that “more than 100 diagnosed
NFL concussions [(more than 10%)] were omitted from the [MTBI] studies.”159
The NFL issued a two-page public statement in response, explaining that the
MTBI Committee analyzed and drew conclusions based on concussions
diagnosed by team medical staff from 1996 through 2001, but that participation
by teams in submitting concussion data was “strongly encouraged by the league
but not mandated.”160 This included omission of all concussions by the Cowboys
during the five-year study range, despite quarterback Troy Aikman suffering
four very public concussions.161 The NFL nonetheless stood by the study and its
subsequent publication in Neurosurgery that suggested that football did not
cause long term harm to players.162

152
Alex Reimer, The NFL’s Crusade to Mask the Dangers of Head Trauma Looks Worse Than Ever,
SBNATION (Mar. 28, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2016/3/28/11250362/nfl-concussions-cteconnection-roger-goodell-comments.
153
Matthew Perlman, NFL Defends Concussion Data, Denies Ties to Big Tobacco, LAW360 (Mar. 24,
2016, 6:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/775941/nfl-defends-concussion-data-denies-ties-to-bigtobacco.
154
Alan Schwarz et al., N.F.L’s Flawed Concussion Research and Ties to Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/sports/football/nfl-concussion-research-tobacco.html.
155
Cerra, supra note 147, at 287.
156
Id.
157
Deubert et al., supra note 32, at 175.
158
See Cerra, supra note 147, at 286–88.
159
Schwarz et al., supra note 154.
160
Perlman, supra note 153.
161
Schwarz et al., supra note 154.
162
See Elise Michael, Note, School of Hard Knocks—The Impact of the NFL Concussion Litigation, 33
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 289, 298–300 (2015).
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The third overlapping strategy used by both the NFL and Big Tobacco is an
emphasis on personal responsibility, a theoretical underpinning to the
assumption of risk doctrine. In particular, both magnified the choice by
individuals to engage in a risky behavior known to potentially harm their health
over time.163 For smokers, this risk was made readily apparent after the 1965
cigarette legislation required a warning label on all cigarette packages.164 For
professional football players, sacrificing one’s body has always been a risk
associated with the game, but the possibility of sacrificing one’s mind has been
clear since (at the latest) the 2009 locker room poster campaign that detailed the
long-term neurological consequences of football.165
B. Why the NFL Context Is Different
Despite the NFL responding to CTE litigation with three strategies that
proved successful for Big Tobacco, the NFL context includes unique pressures
and structures that decrease the potential success of the assumption of risk
doctrine in CTE cases. Specifically, the NFL creates a system that incentivizes
players to downplay the existence or impacts of a concussion through contract
structuring, social pressures, and the impossibility of fully appreciating risk.166
1. Contract Structuring
While multi-million-dollar contracts are common among NFL players,167 the
likelihood that athletes actually receive those hefty salaries is attenuated, as the
NFL has cultivated a series of mechanisms to minimize or extinguish a player’s
163
See Lissy C. Friedman et al., Tobacco Industry Use of Personal Responsibility Rhetoric in Public
Relations and Litigation: Disguising Freedom to Blame as Freedom of Choice, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 250,
250–51 (2015); Reeves Wiedeman, Who’s Responsible for Football’s Concussions?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 24,
2012), https://www.newyorker.com/sports/sporting-scene/whos-responsible-for-footballs-concussions.
164
Jensen, supra note 13.
165
See Amy L. Bernstein, Comment, Into the Red Zone: How the National Football League’s Quest to
Curb Concussions and Concussion-Related Injuries Could Affect Players’ Legal Recovery, 22 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 271, 287 (2012).
166
See Sally Jenkins, NFL’s Concussion Priorities: Dodging Blame, Making Players Responsible, WASH.
POST (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/nfls-concussion-priorities-dodgingblame-making-players-responsible/2015/12/03/1b8752f8-99d2-11e5-94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html.
167
Emmie Martin, Here’s How Much the Highest-Paid NFL Players Make Now, Compared to Their First
Year in the League, CNBC (Aug. 27, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/25/how-much-highestpaid-nfl-players-make.html; see also Aric Jenkins, Tom Brady Isn’t the Highest-Paid NFL Player by a Long
Shot. Here are the Top 5, TIME (Jan. 29, 2018), http://time.com/money/5120707/highest-paid-nfl-player-2018;
Leigh Steinberg, A Historic Breakthrough in Guaranteed NFL Contracts, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2016, 8:03 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2016/08/12/historic-breakthrough-in-guaranteed-nfl-contracts/
#3defe217b739 (contrasting the NFL’s “no guaranteed contract” policy with the injury guarantees offered to
NBA and MLB players).
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earnings and earning potential in instances of injury. Contract structuring
mechanisms, such as (1) yearly physical requirements; (2) performance-based
pay; (3) the potential for salary de-escalation; and (4) split contracts all
incentivize players to underreport or withhold concussion symptoms and return
to play before becoming asymptomatic.168 While these provisions could be
modified via the league’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which takes
precedence over private contracts between teams and players, as well as the
NFL’s constitution and bylaws; the current CBA does not expire until 2020.169
First, although many NFL players sign multi-year contracts, they are still
required to undergo a physical examination at the beginning of each season, and
if they fail, their team is released from any obligation to pay the remaining years
of the contract.170 For example, in 2012, Peyton Manning signed a five-year, $96
million contract with the Denver Broncos, which ensured him $18 million in the
first year but allowed the Broncos to get out of their obligation if Manning
became unable to pass a physical.171 The unfortunate consequence of these
contract provisions is the tendency for players to withhold concussion symptoms
in order to receive the next year’s salary.172
A second contract structuring mechanism that motivates players to
downplay or deny concussion symptoms is performance-based pay.
Performance-based pay is available only to those “who participate in at least one
down during a regular season game” and can be as sizable as $300,000 per
season.173 To calculate an athlete’s performance-based pay, the number of plays
the athlete participated in is divided by the total plays the team ran that season,
placing a financial premium on participation in every single play.174 This
incentivizes athletes to be on the field for as many plays as possible, which they
cannot do if they are sidelined for weeks to properly heal from a concussion.175

168
See generally Theresa S. Kim, Note, Tackling Head Injuries in Youth and Interscholastic Football with
NFL Contract Reform, 24 SPORTS LAW. J. 71, 80–90 (2017) (providing a succinct overview of NFL contract
structuring, a complicated matter due to the myriad of parties involved).
169
Id. at 81.
170
Koczerginski, supra note 26, at 79.
171
Id.
172
Id.; see also Kain, supra note 25, at 710.
173
Kim, supra note 168, at 85–86.
174
Id. at 86.
175
Id. (“[I]f a player misses game time during the regular season from a work-related head injury, he
cannot earn credit toward a playtime incentive in his contract. This incents a player . . . to do whatever he can to
return to play, including failing to fully disclose his symptoms to his team physician . . . .”).
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The NFL takes a similar approach to de-escalation, a third mechanism that
incentivizes players to downplay injuries.176 In contracts containing deescalators, a player’s ability to earn his maximum salary is contingent upon his
meeting certain performance objectives or metrics.177 While these objectives
often include participation in a certain number of games or plays, or earning
certain awards, the NFL does not bar the use of de-escalation provisions to cut
a player’s salary when he misses games or practices due to head injury.178
Accordingly, a player worried about his salary being de-escalated due to missing
too many games or falling short of Pro Bowl qualification is incentivized to push
through or underreport head injuries.
While de-escalation clauses may indirectly motivate players to remain in the
game after suffering a head injury, a fourth NFL contract mechanism, split
contracts, provides direct motivation. Also called “up and down amounts”179 or
“injury splits,”180 split contracts revert a player’s salary to a rate significantly
below the NFL minimum (referred to as a “down”) when a he is placed on
Injured Reserve.181 Although split contracts are creeping into some veteran
contracts,182 they disproportionately impact rookies, late-round draft picks, and
players with a history of injury.183 The additional pressure for young and lateround draft picks to prove themselves and earn a spot on the field may encourage
them to choose “job security over the short haul [versus] quality of life over the
long haul.”184
Just as split contracts might incentivize young and late-round players to
underreport head trauma and prematurely return to play after incurring a
concussion, veterans might also be incentivized by the prospect of losing their
starting positions, and earning potential (including bonuses) tied to those
positions, if they do not return to field prematurely after suffering head trauma.
176

Id. at 82.
Mike Florio, Making Sense of the Kaepernick “De-Escalators”, NBC SPORTS (June 6, 2014, 4:50 PM),
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/06/06/making-sense-of-the-kaepernick-de-escalators/.
178
See Kim, supra note 168, at 85–86.
179
Ted Sundquist, Sports Negotiations – The Discriminatory Nature of the Split Contract, FOOTBALL
EDUCATOR,
http://www.thefootballeducator.com/sports-negotiations-the-discriminatory-nature-of-the-splitcontract/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
180
Kevin Clark, How NFL Players Lost Their Leverage, RINGER (Mar. 16, 2017, 8:30 AM),
https://www.theringer.com/2017/3/16/16077530/nfl-free-agency-players-losing-leverage-864759d6cbdb.
181
Andrew Brandt, The Fine Print of Rookie Contracts in the NFL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 16, 2017),
https://www.si.com/mmqb/2017/05/16/nfl-rookie-contracts-fine-print.
182
Id.
183
See Clark, supra note 180.
184
Gary Mihoces, NFL Concussions: Your Job or Your Health?, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2012, 11:30 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2012/12/03/alex-smith-nfl-concussions/1741691/.
177
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For example, Alex Smith was a veteran starting quarterback for the San
Francisco 49ers in 2012, but lost his starting position to Colin Kaepernick after
he was diagnosed with a concussion and forced to sit inactive for two games.185
Julian Bailes, prominent Chicago neurosurgeon and cofounder of the Brain
Injury Research Institute, commented on Smith’s replacement, stating “We
thought we were making progress on the change in the culture, and now the fact
that this guy, Alex Smith, lost his job once again brings up the issue that the
culture is still in question.”186
In contrast, Big Tobacco had no contractual relationship with the consumers
of its products. Tobacco companies exercised control over smokers only insofar
as they sold an addictive product, not because they offered financial or careerbased incentives to smokers.187 Accordingly, tobacco companies had only a
general corporate social responsibility, created by the mass consumption of their
product, as opposed to the direct contractual responsibility to several hundred
NFL players.
2. Social Pressures
In addition to the formalized contract structuring mechanisms that foster an
unwillingness to report concussions and a desire to reenter play too early, NFL
athletes also face a myriad of social pressures to do so. The most salient pressure
for most NFL players is the “macho culture” or “‘gladiator’ mentality” that the
NFL breeds.188 Former Miami Dolphins linebacker Channing Crowder attested
to this mentality when he remarked, “[i]f I get a chance to knock somebody out,
I’m going to knock them out and take what they give me . . . . They give me a
helmet, I’m going to use it.”189 Crowder is not alone in this ethic, as many NFL
athletes play through the pain under the assumption that their fellow teammates
would do the same,190 while athletes who volunteer to play hurt are lauded by
fans.191 A 2009 Associated Press report revealed that 20% of NFL athletes
surveyed admitted to hiding or downplaying the effects of concussions,
including one who remarked, “I’m always concussed, they just caught me this

185

Id.
Id.
187
See Player, supra note 89, at 325.
188
Koczerginski, supra note 26, at 64, 64 n.5.
189
Michael Klopman, Channing Crowder, Dolphins Linebacker: “They Give Me a Helmet, I’m Going to
Use It”, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2010, 10:15 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/21/channingcrowder-miami-do_n_771215.html.
190
Drysdale, supra note 72, at 447.
191
Koczerginski, supra note 26, at 82.
186
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week.”192 This attitude trickles down to young athletes, such as 44.7% of high
school players surveyed by ESPN who answered “yes” when asked if a good
chance of playing in NFL was worth a “decent chance” of permanent brain
damage.193 54.1% of those same athletes surveyed also responded that they
would play a concussed star athlete in a state title game, despite only 2.1% of
coaches and 9% of trainers opting to do so.194
The warrior mentality synonymous with professional football may arise
from the historic violence integral to the game. Buzz Bissinger, longtime sports
writer and author of Friday Night Lights,195 commented on the inherent brutality,
noting, “[v]iolence is not only embedded in football; it is the very celebration of
it. It is why we like it. Take it away, continue efforts to curtail the savagery, and
the game will be nothing, regardless of age or skill.”196 The player’s body
becomes a means to an end, readily sacrificial and easily replaceable,197 which
is further evidenced by the war language used in football such as blitz, bomb,
and sack.198
An additional social pressure comes from the connection between particular
teams and the regions they represent, such as those hailing from disenfranchised
blue-collar regions. The archetypical example is Mike Webster’s own Pittsburgh
Steelers, where players return to the game with a broken leg or take the financial
penalty for making a risky hit.199 Art Rooney II, the team’s President, attributed
the popularity of this type of play to the attitudes of western Pennsylvanians who
“were accustomed to and appreciated hard work and tough work, and wanted
their football team to reflect that.”200 In a world with encroaching safe spaces,201
192

McGrath, supra note 64.
Hans Gissinger, Concussion Confidential, ESPN MAG. (Dec. 19, 2010), http://www.espn.com/espn/
news/story?id=5925876.
194
Id.
195
See generally BUZZ BISSINGER, FRIDAY NIGHT LIGHTS: A TOWN, A TEAM, AND A DREAM (1990) (a
quintessential sports book, adapted into a popular movie, providing a fictionalized version of the 1988 Permian
High School football team’s run for the Texas state championship).
196
Buzz Bissinger, NFL Playoffs: Buzz Bissinger on Why Football Needs Violence, DAILY BEAST (Jan.
17, 2011, 7:07 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/nfl-playoffs-buzz-bissinger-on-why-football-needsviolence.
197
Hecht, supra note 139, at 38.
198
McGrath, supra note 64; see also Tracee Hamilton, Time to Blow Taps on Football-as-War Metaphors,
WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/time-to-blow-taps-on-footballas-war-metaphors/2012/09/08/6eb00924-f936-11e1-a073-78d05495927c_story.html?utm_term=.f3d61254
a946.
199
See McGrath, supra note 64.
200
Id.
201
See Andrew McGregor, College Football Gives Conservatives Their Own Safe Space on Campus,
WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/09/01/college193
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many from blue-collar regions may feel the football field is one of the last
remaining places where this particular mentality can come to fruition.202
Accordingly, NFL players must meet the demand issued by their cities, their
coaches, and their employer to deliver a hard-hitting, never-say-quit style of
play, even when doing so takes its toll on their minds.203
Similar social pressures to smoke cigarettes were persuasive during the first
wave of tobacco litigation but that parallel to the tobacco context was eliminated
by the 1980s when the glamour and luxury associated with cigarettes was
replaced by stigma and scorn.204 Spurred on by an increasing body of research
documenting the adverse health consequences of smoking and new laws
governing advertising, public opinion of cigarettes plummeted, and, after 1980,
so did rates of smoking among upper- and middle-class Americans.205 Thus, for
more than forty years, there has existed no cognizable social pressure in America
to smoke, and instead the choice to smoke has been met with stigma.206 NFL
athletes pressured to play through head trauma face a vastly different experience,
which judges should take into consideration.
While a prima facie assessment of these social pressures may lead to the
conclusion that they lack sufficient legal relevance such that a judge would not
consider them or include them in jury instructions, studies show that judicial
emotion is often influential and can “sometimes be appropriate, even valuable”
in such decisions.207 For example, a Harvard researcher identified a pattern of
biases surrounding risk beliefs in state court judges that was consistent with
documented studies of human behavior in the general population.208 Thus, while
football-gives-conservatives-their-own-safe-space-on-campus/?utm_term=.2aab622c76bf (“Over the past halfcentury, football has preserved the[] principles [of hierarchy, order, and masculinity], which conservatives view
as under siege by the left. The game and its pageantry, steeped in tradition, have hammered home the tie between
the culture of the past and American greatness, and have imbued men with the perceived competitiveness and
toughness required to thrive in an unforgiving free-market economy. In short, for the right, college football is a
safe space of their own.”).
202
See Irfan Khawaja, Football: The Final Frontier, POLICY OF TRUTH BLOG (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://irfankhawajaphilosopher.com/2018/02/02/football-the-highest-stage-of-imperialism/.
203
See Dennis Waszack Jr., Jets Rookie Jamal Adams Says Football Field “Perfect Place to Die”, CHI.
TRIB. (Aug. 1, 2017, 7:04 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/football/ct-jamal-adams-football-fieldperfect-place-to-die-20170801-story.html (illustrating Jamal Adams’ willingness to die on the football field just
a week after publication of the B.U. study in JAMA).
204
João Mauricio Castaldelli-Maia et al., Tobacco Smoking: From ‘Glamour’ to ‘Stigma’. A
Comprehensive Review, 70 PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES REV. 24, 24–25 (2015).
205
K. Michael Cummings & Robert N. Proctor, The Changing Public Image of Smoking in the United
States: 1964–2014, 23 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 32, 35 (2014).
206
See Castaldelli-Maia et al., supra note 204, at 26–27.
207
Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1211–17 (2012).
208
W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 26–29 (1999).
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mention of the social pressures NFL players face will not be independently
determinative for future CTE plaintiffs, they bear mentioning in response to an
assumption of risk defense.
3. Full Appreciation of Risk
In addition to contract structuring mechanisms and social pressures that
encourage NFL players to hide or underreport concussions, the players may not
fully appreciate the risks of doing so. Falling short of full appreciation can be
attributed to endemic painkiller use by NFL players209 and a unique relationship
to trainers, coaches, and team ownership.210 Assumption of risk doctrine requires
that plaintiffs have not just awareness, knowledge, or constructive notice of
risks, but that they fully understand and appreciate the specific dangers that may
result from their engaging in a particular activity.211 Thus, it would not be
sufficient to show that players understood the general dangers of the football and
nonetheless chose the profession, an argument put forth by former Jacksonville
Jaguars running back Maurice Jones-Drew.212 Instead, players would need to
have full understanding of the specific long- and short-term consequences of an
NFL career, including the risk of neurological problems, such as CTE or
“develop[ing] dementia at a rate nineteen times the normal rate for men between
the ages of thirty and forty-nine.”213
One barrier to NFL players’ full appreciation of risk is the rampant use of
painkillers within the league, which renders players unable to comprehend the
extent of their injuries and make well-informed decisions on the severity of their
injuries. In a complaint originally filed in 2015, over 1800 former players alleged
that team “doctors and trainers negligently supplied narcotics and anti-

209
Nadia Kounang, Lawsuit Alleges that NFL Teams Gave Painkillers Recklessly, CNN (Mar. 13, 2017,
9:55 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/12/health/nfl-painkiller-lawsuit/index.html.
210
See Bob Glauber, A Week in the Life of an NFL Team, NEWSDAY (Sept. 4, 2014, 5:00 AM),
https://www.newsday.com/sports/football/a-week-in-the-life-of-the-nfl-1.9218497; see also Nate Jackson,
What an N.F.L. Training Camp Is Really Like, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2010, 6:00 AM), https://fifthdown.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/08/06/what-an-n-f-l-training-camp-is-really-like/.
211
Werts, supra note 35, at 202–03; see also Hanna & Kain, supra note 33, at 11.
212
Associated Press, Players Still Willing to Hide Head Injuries, ESPN (Dec. 26, 2011),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/7388074/nfl-players-say-hiding-concussions-option (detailing results of
Associated Press interviews with a cross section of NFL players to gauge whether attitudes about head injury
have changed in light of recent focus).
213
Jeremy P. Gove, Note, Three and Out: The NFL’s Concussion Liability and How Players Can Tackle
the Problem, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 649, 685 (2012).
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inflammatory painkillers to keep players on the field.”214 Most commonly used
was the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory Toradol, which players would line up
and receive injections of prior to games, remarking: “We’re going to play no
matter what. You might as well make yourself comfortable.”215 While concerns
about Toradol’s blood-thinning properties making players more susceptible to
concussions has made ibuprofen the pregame painkiller of choice for some
teams,216 NFL athletes are nonetheless numbing their bodies so they can play
through preexisting injuries in a way that also numbs their recognition of new
ones.217 Further, when a player incurs a concussion, regardless of prior painkiller
use, “his cognitive functioning [is] compromised, and his ability to assume the
risk by consenting to play is not entirely informed or valid.”218 Given the
mélange of concussion symptoms and the common delay of symptom onset, an
unknowingly concussed player may plead to return to play without fully
appreciating the extreme risks of repeated blows to the head.219 This magnifies
the reliance players must place on team trainers and medical staff to ensure their
safety.
It follows that another factor limiting NFL players’ ability to fully appreciate
the risk of long-term neurological decay is the relationship between athletes,
coaches, trainers, and team ownership. Athletes spend most of their waking
hours with coaches and trainers, developing a dynamic of loyalty and trust.220
Despite the widespread body of literature on head injuries in the popular press,
which players undoubtedly have access to,221 athletes nonetheless rely on their
coaches and team executives for dissemination of information on occupational

214
The complaint also alleges that in 2012, each team was prescribed 5,777 doses of anti-inflammatories
and 2,270 doses of narcotics. Kounang, supra note 209. Considering that each team has fifty-three players, this
balances out to 150 doses of drugs per player per year. Id.
215
Tyler Dunne, The NFL’s Drug of Choice, BLEACHER REP. MAG. (Jan. 11, 2017), http://thelab.
bleacherreport.com/nfl-toradol-use-players-survey/.
216
Id.; see Louis Bien, Comfortably Numb: The NFL Fell in Love with a Painkiller It Barely Knew,
SBNATION (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.sbnation.com/2016/8/3/12310124/comfortably-numb-the-nfl-fell-inlove-with-a-painkiller-it-barely-knew.
217
See Ashleigh Weinbrecht, Note, The Connection Between Concussions and Chronic Traumatic
Encephalopathy (CTE) in Professional Athletics: A Necessary Change in the “Sports Culture” in Light of Legal
Barriers, 14 J.L. SOCIETY 309, 314 (2013); Gretchen Reynolds, Phys Ed: Does Ibuprofen Help or Hurt During
Exercise?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2009, 11:59 PM), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/phys-ed-doesibuprofen-help-or-hurt-during-exercise/.
218
Heather MacGillivray, Comment, Where is the Awareness in Concussion Awareness: Can Concussed
Players Really Assume the Risk in a Concussed State?, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 529, 532 (2014).
219
Id. at 559–63.
220
See Glauber, supra note 210; see also Jackson, supra note 210.
221
See Jeffrey Standen, Assumption of Risk in NFL Concussion Litigation: The Offhand Empiricism of the
Courtroom, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 71, 80 (2012).

PAOLINI_FINALPROOFS2

638

1/30/2019 1:31 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:607

hazards.222 In a survey of 1,440 NFL players conducted by the Wharton Sports
Business Initiative at the University of Pennsylvania, “90[%]of [respondents]
said they respected their head coach, three-quarters said they trusted their head
coach[,] and . . . . [m]ore than 50[%] of the players said their pro coach – not
their college or high school coach – was the most influential coach in their
lives.”223 A similar trend of trust was found between players and club doctors in
the 2016 Football Players Health Study at Harvard University, funded by the
NFL Players Association, despite the conflicts of interest and dual obligations
these medical providers face.224
The trusting, paternalistic relationship between players and team doctors is
further illustrated by the 2000 Merril Hoge lawsuit. Merril Hoge, a former
running back for the Pittsburgh Steelers and Chicago Bears, defeated the
assumption of risk defense and received a successful verdict against a Bears
team physician for injuries arising from improper handling of his concussions.225
The case began in a 1994 preseason game wherein Hoge, playing for the Bears,
suffered an “earthquake” of a concussion when he was hit from several
directions at once.226 He stayed on the field for the next two plays, before pulling
himself out due to concussive symptoms.227 Despite struggling to remember
plays, Hoge returned to the starting lineup despite sitting out just one preseason
game, and six weeks later received a second concussion.228 This time, Hoge’s
symptoms were more serious and long-lasting, including “‘headaches,
sensitivity to light, and anger management issues.’”229 As a result, Hoge filed
suit against the Bears’ team physician, Dr. John Munsell, alleging Munsell failed
to warn him about the dangers of sustaining subsequent and more severe
concussions and that Munsell negligently allowed him to return to play without
a proper examination.230
In response, Dr. Munsell employed the assumption of risk defense, arguing
that Hoge had a duty to “tell people he was not feeling well.”231 However, this
defense failed. Hoge lacked adequate knowledge of the signs and symptoms of
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concussions or the risks associated with returning to play while still symptomatic
and thus could not have knowingly and voluntarily assumed the short and longterm risks of such injury.232 Ultimately, the jury found in favor of Hoge and
awarded him $1.55 million.233 The Hoge verdict demonstrates not only the
relationship of trust between players and team doctors but also the potential for
an NFL player to overcome the assumption of risk defense.
Trusting relations like that between Hoge and Munsell and the endemic use
of painkillers, both of which prevent NFL players from fully appreciating risk,
have no accompanying parallel in tobacco cases. Smokers did not spend hours
each day with tobacco executives and salesmen or rely on them for
dissemination of health information, as smokers’ only connection to companies
like R.J. Reynolds was through consumption of the product they sold.
Additionally, while the addictive qualities of nicotine made smokers more likely
to continue using cigarettes, they do not mask smokers’ ability to experience and
act on the seriousness of the harms they incurred. In this regard, NFL athletes
have a unique pressure that should inform arguments made by CTE plaintiffs
attempting to overcome the assumption of risk defense.
C. Counterarguments and Refutations
Critics may respond to this Comment by arguing that both Big Tobacco and
the NFL actively nurtured social pressures to engage in the dangerous activity.
That enticement to engage did not bar Big Tobacco’s use of assumption of risk,
however, and accordingly, it will not bar the NFL’s employment of the doctrine.
Big Tobacco not only targeted vulnerable subpopulations such as children, gay
and lesbian persons, and minority racial groups,234 but it also developed versions
of cigarettes marketed as “low-tar” or “safe” in the 1960s while maintaining or
increasing nicotine levels to keep customers hooked.235
Despite the fact that these manipulative tactics did not disqualify Big
Tobacco from employing the assumption of risk doctrine, the time period in
which they did so is relevant. These marketing tactics surged from the 1950s
through the 1970s but were no longer abundant by the 1980s, when the
dangerousness of cigarettes was common knowledge.236 By 1994, when the
232
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Cigarette Papers that outlined what tobacco companies really knew were
released, these marketing tactics were nearly extinguished.237 As a result, they
no longer provide a useful point of comparison with the current NFL context,
which is most factually comparable with the second era of tobacco litigation.
Moreover, tobacco companies have nonetheless been forced to pay for these
strategies and are still doing so via a court order for “corrective statements.”238
Under this order, tobacco companies like Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds are
forced to air a series of commercials on prime-time TV “detail[ing] the health
effects of smoking, the addictiveness of cigarettes, and the dangers of
secondhand smoke and low-tar cigarettes, among other health concerns.”239
A second counterargument that NFL athletes should not be able to overcome
the assumption of risk defense hinges on the power that NFL players have to
bargain over the terms and conditions of their employment via the CBA. Some
scholars argue that NFL players “are not faceless consumers but instead are
unionized employees with substantial input into all facets of the game, including
the rules” such that when they refrain from exercising that power “they
voluntarily accept[] the consequences of those rules.”240 Players like Richard
Sherman, the San Francisco 49ers cornerback, echo this sentiment by asserting
that “[n]obody who chooses to play this sport should be described as
defenseless.”241
However, input into the CBA is not quite as empowering or encompassing
as it may seem. CBAs are binding for a decade, with the most recent one set to
expire after the 2020 season,242 yet the average NFL career lasts only 3.3
years.243 Consequently, most players begin and end their careers under the
limitations of one CBA with no power to influence the next.244 Moreover, the
Executive Committee of players in the National Football League Players
Association whose voices are most acutely heard in CBA negotiations are longtime veterans whose loyalty to coaches, owners, and the old-school, down-and237
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dirty style of play245 may be more entrenched than younger players.246 Further,
research on traumatic brain injury in sports is constantly changing and updating,
resulting in a present context much different than it was ten years ago.247 Even
if players do have the capacity to take control of their safety via CBA
negotiations, it does not follow that what constituted safety during the first year
of the CBA is still true in the tenth year. Accordingly, the argument that players
assume the risk of head injury because of the mere existence of a CBA does not
aptly describe how little these decades-long agreements represent the present
experiences and voices of NFL athletes.
CONCLUSION
Serving as a role model to coaches, athletes, and regulatory bodies at
collegiate, high school, and youth levels, the NFL has set a dangerous tone
surrounding traumatic brain injury on the field. Taking a page (or perhaps an
entire chapter) from the Big Tobacco playbook, the NFL denied any connection
between football and CTE, flooded academic journals with questionable
research, and shifted responsibility to vulnerable parties. Despite the NFL’s
denials, a growing body of scientific research, state statutory provisions, and
concerned mothers248 represent a societal shift in attitude—a critical mass
yearning for the NFL to prioritize public health over profits.249 As Pro Football
Hall of Famer Terry Bradshaw asserts, “[the NFL is] forced to care now because
it’s politically correct to care. Lawsuits make you care. . . . [T]he PR makes you
care.”250
With presumptive lawsuits looming in the near future, including that of
Aaron Hernandez, this Comment provides a framework for overcoming the
assumption of risk defense that CTE plaintiffs will inevitably face. To prove
assumption of risk, the NFL would need to demonstrate that players were not
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only aware of but fully appreciated the long-term neurological risk they incurred
when suiting up each Sunday.251 However, the complex nature of CTE amidst
the NFL’s contract policies and macho attitude promotion are such that players
cannot fully appreciate the risk and therefore cannot possibly be responsible for
predicting their long-term cognitive decline.252 Thus, while there is no smoking
gun memo as in the Big Tobacco litigation that reveals industry knowledge and
responsibility,253 the circumstantial distinctions between football and tobacco
are such that the assumption of risk defense should not apply to CTE plaintiffs.
Until a plaintiff succeeds in overcoming the defense, players will continue
getting their bells rung and the sentiments of Pro Football Hall of Famer Frank
Gifford will continue ringing true: “Pro football is like nuclear warfare. There
are no winners, only survivors.”254 Should a plaintiff successfully overcome the
defense, a slew of new questions would arise surrounding ethics, class, and
medicine, the most obvious being: is there any time left for a Hail Mary to
salvage the essence of modern football, or is this game over?
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